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Abstract 
We analyse both theoretically and empirically, the factors that influence the amount 
of humanitarian aid which countries receive when they are struck by natural disasters. Our 
investigation particularly distinguishes between immediate disaster relief which helps the 
survival of victims and long term humanitarian aid given towards reconstruction and 
rehabilitation. The theoretical model is able to make predictions as well as explain some of 
the peculiarities in the empirical results. The empirical analysis, making use of some useful 
data sources, show that both short and long term humanitarian aid increase with number of 
people killed, financial loss and level of corruption, while GDP per capita has no effect. 
Number of people affected had no effect on short term aid, but significantly increased long 
term aid. Both types of aid increased if the natural disaster was an earthquake, tsunami or 
drought. In addition, short term aid increases in response to a flood while long term aid 
increases in response to storms.    
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1. Introduction 
During the last few decades, there has been a heightened awareness of natural disasters 
around the world. Dilley et al. (2005) estimated that 3.4 billion people, who constitute more 
than half of the world's population, live in areas which are exposed to at least one significant 
hazard. In 2008 alone, natural disasters around the world resulted in nearly 300 million 
people being affected, 400,000 people being killed and a massive financial loss of $190 
billion.
1
 According to the annual report of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2009, US$157 million was pledged towards and disbursed 
as humanitarian aid in that year. The level of aid-flow and the severity with which natural 
disasters affect people have prompted researchers to study this issue from several angles. Our 
paper contributes to the strand of literature which studies the determinants of disaster relief/ 
humanitarian aid (both terms are used interchangeably throughout this paper).  
This paper consists of an empirical investigation as well as a theoretical analysis as to 
how the various factors affect the amount of humanitarian aid disbursed by the donors, 
distinguishing between short term and long term aid. We define immediate disaster relief as 
the assistance given to victims of natural disasters who require basic humanitarian assistance 
such as medical care, food, shelter etc. to help them survive in the aftermath of the disaster 
and alleviate their suffering. Long term humanitarian aid is defined as the assistance given 
towards disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation to help rebuild the victims' personal assets, 
the communities' infrastructure or public services such as hospitals, schools, roads, bridges, 
shops, fishing boats, farms and personal financial losses that have been affected by the 
natural disasters. The determinants of these two types of aid could be different.  
Papers in the existing literature lack a theoretical framework which explains the donors' 
decision making on how to allocate humanitarian aid, a gap which we attempt to fill through 
this paper. To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper that makes a distinction between 
immediate disaster relief and long term humanitarian aid, either in a theoretical framework or 
in an empirical analysis. The theoretical model presented in our paper makes some 
predictions and provide an understanding on how the aid disbursement works. The results of 
the model help explain the outcomes of the empirical investigation that follows, including 
some apparent puzzles. 
In the empirical literature on disaster relief, there are few papers that study the 
determinants of humanitarian aid. Olsen et al. (2003) investigate the determinants of 
humanitarian aid based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis. They find that there are 
three key factors that determine the amount of humanitarian aid disbursed by the donors, 
namely the intensity of media coverage; the degree of donors' political and security interest 
and the strength of humanitarian NGOs and international organisations in the affected 
country. 
Stromberg (2007) investigates the factors which determine whether or not humanitarian 
aid is given (unlike our analysis where the dependent variable is the amount of humanitarian 
aid), using data on 3200 natural disasters that occurred between 1980-2004. He finds that 
colonial history, common language, trade relations and close proximity will increase the 
probability of receiving disaster relief. Fink and Redaelli (2009) use data which describes the 
way in which five main donor countries responded to 400 natural disasters. The results from 
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 Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters(CRED) provides this information on 
their web site, http://www.emdat.be/. 
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their empirical analysis shows that bilateral humanitarian aid is determined by political and 
strategic interests of donors, captured by the close proximity between the donor and the 
recipient countries; the availability of crude oil in the recipient countries and whether the 
recipient countries are former colonies. According to an empirical analysis by Raschky and 
Schwindt (2009), donors are influenced by strategic interests such as availability of oil and 
trade relationships. Eisensee and Stromberg (2007) show that media coverage of disasters 
draw more disaster relief by studying the response of the US government to natural disasters 
between 1968-2002, by checking whether the disaster occurred during other newsworthy 
events. Yang (2008) carried out an empirical analysis to conclude that hurricanes have a 
positive impact on foreign aid. 
Existing research has focused on bilateral aid, analysing the factors that have led a 
specific country to give aid to another specific country such as colonial past, language, 
distance, political strategy, trade opportunities etc. We are focusing on the total amount of 
disaster relief that is received in response to different disasters and seeing how these relate to 
not only some features of the country -- population, GDP per capita, measures of corruption, 
but more importantly to features of the disaster itself - its nature, scale and severity. Does the 
international community as a whole end up giving more aid to those who are in greater need 
as a result of greater damage? 
In the empirical section of our paper, a panel data analysis is performed, based on data on 
countries affected by natural disasters over the period of 1995 - 2008 and the humanitarian 
aid - both immediate relief and long term - that was received. Such an empirical investigation 
is possible because of two data sets that are available. The first data set, EM-DAT, is 
maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the 
University of Louvain, which gives information about the occurrences of all the natural 
disasters and the damages caused by them such as the amount of financial loss, the number of 
people killed and the number of people affected by the natural disasters.
2
 The second data set 
is the Project-Level Aid (PLAID) data set developed by William and Mary University and 
Brigham Young University.
3
 This dataset provides a detailed coding which gives information 
about when and why the aid was given. This enables us to select data only on disaster relief 
disbursed in response to natural disasters as well as distinguish between short-term and long-
term disaster reliefs. The data had to be screened, categorised and matched according to what 
we needed before being used in our empirical analysis. 
In our analysis, we consider three natural disaster-specific characteristics which can 
affect the amount of aid it attracts: its nature, scale and severity. The nature of the disaster is 
related to whether it is a flood, earthquake, epidemic etc. The scale of disaster is the number 
of people affected. People can be affected in several ways: loss inflicted on a person through 
injury, illness and potential or even actual loss of life; while loss of property refers to damage 
to homes and/or means of livelihood (e.g. boats). Some victims require immediate relief to 
save their lives while others require long term aid to rebuild their lives. Severity can be 
thought of as being measured in terms of the extent of loss to the person and property, so it 
could be reflected in factors such as the number of people killed and amount of financial loss. 
We put forward a theoretical model which is simple but quite powerful and capable of 
generating all our empirical findings. Once a country is hit by a natural disaster, the aid 
agency has to decide the type of humanitarian aid to be given to the affected country. The 
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 This can be found on http://www.emdat.be/database 
3
 This data is available on the web site, www.aiddata.org. 
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model also distinguishes between short term and long term humanitarian aid. In the 
theoretical model we consider immediate relief to reduce the probability of death of those 
who face the risk of dying as a result of the natural disaster. The long term aid restores part of 
the financial loss that is suffered by the victims. 
The model investigates first of all, whether there are any underlying determinants 
relating to both the scale and severity of the disaster and to the socioeconomic features of the 
country that help explain the different amount of short-term and long-term humanitarian aid 
that are given to different countries.
4
 Then the model goes on to relate both types of aid to the 
variables that we observe, i.e. number affected, killed, the amount of financial loss, the GDP 
per capita and the level of corruption. This enables us to compare the theoretical predictions 
with the empirical results.  
The summary of our results is as follows. According to the empirical analysis, both long 
term and short term humanitarian aid increase with the number of people killed and financial 
loss. Those who are dead cannot benefit from the increase in aid. Financial loss should attract 
long term aid to restore the damaged property, but why should it attract short term aid? The 
theoretical model shows that these outcomes are indeed possible. Long term aid also 
significantly increases with the total number of people affected according to the empirical 
analysis. The GDP per capita was found to be not statistically significant in determining 
either type of humanitarian aid. The theoretical model shows the effect to be ambiguous. The 
level of corruption significantly increased both types of aid. Even though it is a surprising 
result, considering this is for humanitarian purposes, donors seem to care sufficiently about 
the victims that they increase the aid in order to help them, even though much of it will be 
leaked. The theoretical model shows that if the donor is sufficiently inequality averse, and the 
level of corruption is not that high, there would be an increase in humanitarian aid when the 
level of corruption increases. Immediate relief significantly increases if the type of disaster 
that struck was flood, earthquake, tsunami or drought, while long term humanitarian aid 
significantly increased if the disaster was earthquake, tsunami, drought or storm. Extreme 
weather conditions significantly reduced both types of aid while wildfires significantly 
reduced the long term aid. This means donors should be made aware that these two types of 
disasters deserve more aid compared with other types which cause damage of similar scale 
and severity. 
Our paper is also related to a few other strands of literature that looks at economic losses 
and human losses as a consequence of natural disasters. Cavallo and Noy (2009) provide a 
good survey of the literature about the impact of natural disasters, including the data sources 
of such information and analyse the long term and short term effects of natural disasters. 
Raddatz (2007) finds that natural disasters negatively affect short run output; however, the 
effect is quite small. A similar result is obtained by Noy (2009) who shows that this negative 
effect is exacerbated if the country has low level of government spending, GDP per capita, 
                                                          
4 Although we recognise that the amount of each type of aid could well vary depending 
on the nature of the disaster (we include this in our empirical analysis), we will suppress any 
explicit reference to the nature of the disaster. We also recognise that the actual amount of aid 
given to any country will depend on certain country-specific factors such as difficulty of 
terrain, extent of transport infrastructure, etc. However we have no data on these so they will 
be treated as exogenous factors that just account for the unexplained cross-sectional variation 
across countries in the amounts of aid given. So, as with the nature of the disaster, we will 
ignore any explicit reference to country-specific effects. 
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foreign exchange reserves; less number of institutions and people have low literacy rate. 
Raddatz (2009) also says that the negative effect of a natural disaster is most prominent 
during the first year. Loayza (2009) shows that large disasters always have a negative effect 
on the economy in the short run. In the empirical study conducted by Jaramillo (2009) which 
used a panel of 113 countries over 36 years to do an empirical study, the results shows that 
countries that are more vulnerable to repeated attacks of natural disasters do experience long 
term negative effects beyond 2 - 5 years. However, their study shows that only a very small 
number of countries sustain permanent structural changes. 
There are some papers [Maccini and Yang (2009), Ferreira and Schady (2009), Carter et 
al (2007)] which point out that in addition to the impact that can be felt by the region in the 
short term because of the number of people killed affected and financial damages, there can 
also be long term impact on households, affecting their health, education and recovery of 
assets etc.  
    De Mel et al (2011) show that enterprise recovery was very slow in Sri Lanka following 
the tsunami in 2004, despite the aid given specifically to help microenterprise. Because 
donors are more concerned about the basic lives and livelihood of victims, assisting 
businesses may not be given sufficient support. In developed countries such as the US, the 
formal insurance sector is more sophisticated so that businesses affected by natural disasters 
can recover better, which is discussed in Runyan (2006). 
Through an empirical analysis, Khan (2005) finds that the number of people who die due 
to natural disasters is higher in poorer countries, mainly because the rich countries can invest 
in disaster preparedness. Countries with higher inequality would face the same problem since 
less concern is given to the poor who are trapped in the vulnerable areas.  
The empirical analysis of Toya and Skidmore (2006) shows that economic and human 
losses due to natural disasters are lower in countries that have higher income, literacy, 
openness and smaller government. Raddatz (2009) says that smaller and poorer states are 
more severely affected by natural disasters. Anttila-Hughs and Hsiang (2011) have done an 
in-depth study of the impact of environmental disasters in Philippines and the extent to which 
the household are affected. 
There are some papers which study the decision of donors whether to give cash or in-
kind aid. Raschky and Schwindt (2009) use a theoretical and empirical analysis to analyse 
donors' decision whether to give cash or in-kind aid and decide whether aid should be 
bilateral or multilateral. The finding from their theoretical analysis was that if donors care 
about stabilisation, they would be more inclined to give in-kind transfers and make it a 
multilateral aid. The empirical finding was that recipients with good governance will be given 
cash and bilateral aid. Moreover, if the number of people killed is high, GDP per capita is low 
and the donor have less strategic interest (i.e. no oil and not that much of trade relationship) 
the recipient countries will receive in-kind and multilateral aid. Amegashie et al, (2007) put 
forward a theoretical and empirical methodology to investigate whether donors use in-kind or 
restricted aid in response to moral hazard in the usage of the aid. According to the empirical 
analysis, bilateral donors increase the proportion of in-kind aid in response to moral hazard 
behaviour of recipients, whereas multilateral donors do not.  
Another strand of literature investigates whether there are factors which influence the 
occurrence of natural disasters. Stromberg (2007) conducted a formal econometric analysis to 
show that natural disasters may be less severe in high-income countries with efficient and 
accountable governments and countries with lower economic inequality. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the 
theoretical framework. Section 3 is devoted for the empirical analysis, while section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Model 
There are     countries that are hit by a particular type of natural disaster. An aid 
agency has a humanitarian aid budget,  , which has to be allocated to these different 
countries as both short-term and long-term aid. Consider a particular country,  . The average 
income of this country before the disaster struck is     , which indicates the level of 
development of this country. The degree of corruption in this country is   , where      
 ; thus for any given amount of humanitarian aid given as either short-term or long-term aid 
only a fraction        reaches the intended recipients. The two parameters,    and   , 
capture the socioeconomic characteristics of this country. Now consider in turn the factors 
that might affect the amount of long-term and short-term aid to be given to each country. 
    Long-Term Humanitarian Aid 
Let   
  be the number of people who have survived the disaster but have suffered some 
financial loss. Long-term aid is needed for reconstruction and rehabilitation. The scale of the 
disaster in terms of the need for long-term aid is measured by  
 . Assume that each person 
suffers, on average, a financial loss of      
   , where     
   , so that they are left 
with an average income of      
     after the disaster. The severity of the disaster in terms 
of the need for long-term aid is measured by   
 . Therefore, the total financial loss in country 
  is 
     
      
   
                                                                     
This measure reflects both the scale and severity of the long-term humanitarian problem 
facing country  . Let   
 , where     
    denote the fraction of an individual's financial 
loss that is restored through long-term humanitarian aid. The restriction that no more than the 
whole loss is restored reflects the fact that this is humanitarian rather than general 
development aid. The total welfare from the long-term aid given to country   is measured by 
  
    
  [  (    
    
 
 
  
 )]
 
                                            
where      is an individual welfare function that reflects the agency's views about how 
individual well-being relates to consumption, and is assumed not to vary across countries. 
The welfare function is assumed to satisfy the usual conditions          . We make the 
relatively standard assumption that the aid agency's individual welfare belongs to the class for 
which          , where     is a measure of the agency's inequality aversion. 
Taking into account the level of corruption in country  , the total amount of long-term 
humanitarian aid,  
   that would have to be given to country   by the aid agency to achieve 
the level of welfare,  
 , is given by: 
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    Short-Term Humanitarian Aid 
Let   
  be the number of people in need of short-term humanitarian aid and so potentially 
at risk of dying if they do not receive such assistance. This measures the scale of the disaster 
in terms of the need for short-term humanitarian. It is treated as fixed and independent 
of   
 .
5
 Assume that a fraction   
 , where     
   , of these people will survive if, on 
average, each of them receives an amount of resource     
    
     where, as we will see, 
    
    is a parameter that will measure the severity of the disaster that has struck 
country   in terms of the need for short-term aid. 
Assume that the generic form of the cost function        satisfies the following 
conditions for all  , where     
    and for all  , where     
   : 
    (i)             which means if no aid is given, then no one survives. 
   (ii)                                  as       . The marginal cost of 
increasing the survival rate is positive, increasing and tends to infinity as the fraction 
of those who survive tends to the limit set by the severity of the disaster; the fraction 
of people who survive will be bounded above by a factor that depends on the severity 
of the disaster. The more severe the disaster, the smaller the fraction of people who 
will survive. 
  (iii)                      , which captures the fact that an increase in the severity of 
the disaster increases both the total and the marginal cost of any survival fraction. 
    An example of a function that satisfies all these conditions is 
       
 
 
[(  
 
   
)
  
  ]                                              
where the parameters         6 
Notice that since      
      
  it follows that the fraction of people who ultimately 
die as a result of the disaster,     
 , is greater than   
 , our measure of the severity of the 
disaster. Given this interpretation of the short term severity parameter,   
   it represents the 
fraction of the population at risk who cannot be saved because they are killed more or less 
outright. In this sense it provides a useful measure of the severity of the disaster. The number 
of people killed outright in country   is therefore 
     
   
                                                                                      
which reflects both, the severity and scale of the short-term disaster. 
                                                          
5
This should not be taken to imply that there is no overlap between those receiving short-term humanitarian aid 
and those receiving long-term aid. When giving short term humanitarian aid, the aid agency does not engage in 
any calculus whereby it anticipates that some of those whose lives it saves will subsequently call on it for long 
term aid. Essentially it accepts the numbers who need short term aid, gives relief and then accepts the total 
number who need longer term financial aid to rebuild their lives - whether or not they had previously received 
short-term relief. 
6 We can generalise the class slightly by using the function            (  
 
   
) where      
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We assume that the perceived benefit to the aid agency of saving a life - i.e. increasing 
survival - is     
         which is independent of the scale and severity of the disaster as 
well as the affected country. This formulation reflects three key assumptions. First, we allow 
for the possibility that the value of saving a life may depend on the severity of the disaster, so 
the larger the number of people killed outright the greater is the imperative perceived by the 
agency to try to stop yet more people dying. Secondly, the value of saving a life is 
independent of   
 , the fraction of lives saved. In particular there is no diminishing marginal 
benefit. This reflects the assumption that the aid agency believes that each life that can be 
saved is just as valuable as every other life that is saved. Finally, conditioning on the severity 
of the disaster, the value of saving a life does not depend on the country struck by disaster or 
the nature of the disaster, which reflect the assumption that the value of saving a life is the 
same across countries and independent of the nature of the disaster. We introduce a two-
parameter class of function as a specific functional form for the aid agency's benefit of saving 
a life, given by equation (6), which satisfies the above conditions and will be useful in our 
analysis later: 
                                                                                           
where             are constants. This formulation allows for the possibility that the 
severity of the disaster could affect the perceived benefit of saving a life in different ways. As 
we will see later, if      then disasters which are very mild will receive no short-term 
funding. On the other hand if      then disasters that are extremely severe will also receive 
no short-term aid - reflecting the perception that it is so difficult to save any further lives that 
it is not worth spending resources attempting to do so. We realise these are strong 
assumptions and draw attention to the fact that this specific functional form does allow   to 
be independent of severity when      . 
The total welfare from the short-term humanitarian aid given to country   is 
  
    
   
     
                                                                                     
and, taking into account the effective aid that benefits the intended victims, the total amount 
of short-term humanitarian aid given by the agency to country   is 
  
  
  
     
    
  
      
                                                                                   
 
2.1. The Aid Agency's Decision Problem 
The aid agency's objective is to maximise the total welfare,    
    
  . For each 
country,  , it takes as given the socioeconomic characteristics of that country,        , and 
both the scale and severity of the short-term and long-term characteristics of the disaster that 
has struck that country -    
    
   and    
    
   respectively - and chooses   
    
    
       to maximise (9), subject to (10). 
         ∑ {  
   
       
  [  (    
    
 
 
  
 )]
  
}
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  [  (    
    
 
 
  
 )]
  
    
}                                         
At an interior solution the first order conditions are given in (11) to (13): 
    
   
   ( ̂ 
    
 )  
    
  ̂ 
                                                                   
           [  (    
   ̂ 
   
 )]   
   
   
    
     ̂ 
                                            
      ̂ 
                                                                                                 
where    is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint  ̂ 
   , and each pair of inequalities 
holds with complementary slackness. Similar Lagrange multipliers are not needed for the 
short-term aid because of our assumption on the cost function      
    
   that  ̂ 
      
 . 
The Lagrange multiplier for constraint (10) is given by  . 
The focus of our paper is to explain why, in a given allocation, some disasters get neither 
short term nor long term aid, and why, for those that do receive aid, some attract more short-
term and/or long-term aid than others. In what follows, we treat   as a constant and see how 
the amount of short-term and long-term aid given to each country is influenced by the 
socioeconomic factors and the scale and severity of the disaster. For notational simplicity, the 
sub-script,   for country is now dropped. 
Before proceeding to develop the cross-section implications of (11) and (12) for the 
determinants of aid there are two general points to note. The first point is that the optimal 
fractions  ̂ 
   ̂ 
 }, and hence the amount of short-term and long-term aid received by each 
individual do not depend on the scale of the disaster in country   but only on the severity of 
the disaster and the socioeconomic characteristics of the country, which include the GDP per 
capita and the scale of corruption. 
Secondly we note that in reality, the donors do not directly observe the theoretical 
constructs of the model - the scale and severity of the short-term and long-term humanitarian 
disaster facing a country. Rather what can be observed are some related variables: the number 
of people killed, the number of people affected and the financial loss. These are related to the 
scale and severity of the short and long-term aspects of the humanitarian crises. Equation (1) 
tells us how financial loss is related. The total number of people affected by the disaster 
(defined as those suffering injury, illness, loss to home and/or livelihood) in country   can be 
written as, 
        
    
    
                                                                              
Notice that it follows from (5) and (14) that the number of people killed would be, 
     
    
                                                                                       
However (1), (14) and (15) constitute just three equations in what are in principle four 
variables characterising the scale and severity of both the short-term and long-term 
humanitarian disaster that have hit a country. It is reasonable to assume that typically the 
severity of these two aspects of the humanitarian crises is related. In fact we make a rather 
strong assumption that they are identical, i.e. that   
    
  and denote this common value by 
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 . We can rearrange (1), (14) and (15) to obtain functions for the scale and severity of the 
disaster as follows: 
   
   
  
  
 
                                                                                  
 
   
   
  
 
  
                                                                                  
  
 
   
   
                                                                                      
Notice that in order for the severity of the disaster to satisfy the condition that     it must 
be that case that 
 
 
             
 
 
                                                                         
which states that the scale of the financial loss per person affected must be less than the 
average income. In what follows we assume that (19) always holds. 
Proposition 1 predicts how the scale and severity of the disaster (number of people 
needing long term aid, number of people needing short term aid and the extent of both types 
of losses captured by  ) are affected by the variables that can be observed (total number of 
people who are affected, number of people who are killed outright, financial loss and average 
income). We can easily prove Proposition 1 using (16) to (19).  
The number of people needing long term aid increases with the total number of people 
affected and financial loss, while it decreases with the number of people killed and average 
income. Number of people in need of short term aid increases with total number of people 
affected, number of people killed and average income, but goes down with financial loss. As 
financial loss increases, it increases those needing long term aid, at the expense of those 
needing short term aid. Number of people killed indicates the severity of the disaster whereby 
people being in danger of losing lives - increasing those in need of short term aid at the 
expense of long term aid. Increase in the number of people killed and financial loss obviously 
indicates a higher level of severity of disaster, whereas a higher average income points 
towards a lower severity, as would the number of people affected (higher the scale, lower the 
severity). Having higher income will result in the country receiving less long term aid, so that 
it requires the agency to give it more short term aid to save its victims. 
Proposition 1    
   
  
   
   
  
   
   
  
   
   
  
    
(ii) 
   
  
   
   
  
   
   
  
   
   
  
    
(iii) 
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2.2. Determinants of Long-Term Humanitarian Aid 
We start developing the predictions of the theory in relation to the theoretical constructs 
of the model. Notice from (12) that the optimal fraction of property loss that is restored,  ̂ 
  
depends solely on (i) the severity of the disaster; (ii) the degree of corruption in the country in 
which the disaster has occurred; (iii) the level of per capita GDP in the country in which the 
disaster has occurred. It is independent of the long-term scale of the disaster. 
Consider first the issue of how likely it is that no long term aid will be given - so  ̂ 
   . 
According to (12) this will happen if 
      (
 
   
   
)                                                                                                             
This shows that it is more likely that no long term aid will be given when the severity of the 
disaster is lower and at higher levels of income and corruption of the country. 
Next, consider the possibility that   ̂ 
    so that the financial loss that is suffered due to 
the disaster is fully restored. From (13) we see that this will happen if 
      (
 
   
)                                                                                                                 
Thus, it is more likely that the financial loss is fully restored by the aid agency, the poorer 
and lesser corrupt the country in which the disaster occurs. However this condition does not 
depend on the severity of the disaster. 
Whenever long term aid is given, partially restoring the financial loss,     ̂ 
   , then 
it follows from (12) and (13) that   ̂ 
  will be a strictly decreasing function of the levels of 
corruption and per capita GDP of the country in which the disaster occurs; and a strictly 
increasing function of the severity of the disaster. It follows from the above discussion that 
the total amount of long-term humanitarian aid decided by the aid agency is as given in (22). 
  ̂  
{
  
 
  
            (
 
   
   
)
 
  
   
[    (
 
   
)        ]         (
 
   
)        (
 
   
   
)
 
    
   
         (
 
   
) }
  
 
  
 
          
 
The amount of long-term humanitarian aid depends on four factors: the scale of the 
disaster,  ; the severity of the disaster,   ; the level of corruption,   and the GDP per capita, 
 . It is straightforward to see that  ̂  is directly proportional to   and that it is also 
increasing in  . In the case of   , it is strictly increasing when income is below     (
 
   
) but 
strictly decreasing when income is above this level. So, the aid agency tends to focus aid on 
poorer countries, leaving richer ones to repair the consequences of the disaster from their own 
resources. 
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The impact of corruption is less clear cut. There is a direct effect through which aid 
increases in the level of corruption to benefit the victims, but there is also an indirect effect 
whereby the greater the corruption the smaller the fraction of damage restored, leading to the 
prediction that, if the level of corruption is sufficiently high no aid will be given. In what 
follows we will use the specific functional form that we introduced earlier,          . In 
which case, 
    (
 
   
)        
 
                                                                                                       
where    
 
 . Substituting (23) into (22) we get the following: 
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How long-term aid changes with corruption is shown in (25). 
  ̂ 
  
  
  
      
[ 
          
 
 
 
         ]                                                     
It is clear that if    , then 
  ̂ 
  
   - i.e. when the aid agency's inequality aversion is low, 
long-term aid is a decreasing function of corruption. What about the outcome when    ? 
We can re-write (25) as follows. 
  ̂ 
  
  
  
      
[  (
       
      
)
 
  ]                                                                     
Therefore 
  ̂ 
  
 0 if     (
       
      
)
 
. When    , then [  (
       
      
)
 
]   . Since   
 , we can only have a situation where     (
       
      
)
 
. So we can conclude that if    , 
  ̂ 
  
 0 - i.e. when inequality aversion is sufficiently high, long-term aid is an increasing 
function of corruption. The above analysis about how long term aid is affected can be 
summarised in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2 Long-term humanitarian aid is  
(i) an increasing function of the scale and severity of the disaster;  
(ii) not affected by per-capita GDP on long term humanitarian aid for 
both very poor and very rich countries, for other countries, an 
inverse U-shaped function of per-capita GDP;  
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(iii) a decreasing function of the level of corruption if the aid agency is 
not too inequality averse,    ;  
(iv) an increasing function of the level of corruption if the aid agency 
is sufficiently inequality averse,    . 
Now we move on to relate long-term humanitarian aid to factors that are observable, 
namely number of people killed, affected and financial loss. We can re-write (22) as follows, 
by substituting out (1) and (16): 
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Using (27) and the predictions of Proposition 1 regarding the scale and severity of the long 
term aid requirement, we make the following analysis. It is straight forward to see that 
  ̂ 
  
   when       
 
    
      
 
 
   
 
. This could be because the increase in the total scale 
indicates a reduction in the severity of the disaster with less people killed. It is also worth 
drawing attention to the fact that when   
      
 
 
   
 
,  ̂  will fully restore what is lost and is 
not dependent on  . Similarly, when         
 
 , there will be no short term aid, and 
therefore will not be influenced by  . 
    When the number of people killed increases, the affected country is given more long term 
aid, 
  ̂ 
  
  [
[        
 
 ] (  
  
 )
 
(  
  
 )
 ]                                                                              
Because 
  
 
  , we can conclude that 
  ̂ 
  
  . 
When financial loss increases, there is a positive direct impact on long term aid, which 
however, is counteracted by a negative indirect effect working via the impact of financial loss 
on the scale of the disaster. Therefore the effect is ambiguous. 
  ̂ 
  
   
  [        
 
 ]       
(  
  
 )
 
  
                                                                   
Proposition 3 summarises how long term aid is affected by the observable features of the 
disaster. 
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Proposition 3 Long-term humanitarian aid is a decreasing function of the number of 
people affected and an increasing function of the number of people killed, while the 
impact of financial loss on long-term humanitarian aid is ambiguous. 
 
2.3. Determinants of Short-Term Humanitarian Aid 
As with long-term aid, we begin by deriving predictions in terms of the constructs of the 
theory - particularly the scale and severity of the disaster - and then turn to the predictions in 
terms of observables. If we consider first the issue of how likely it is that no short term aid 
will be given - so  ̂ 
   - then we see from (11) that the greater the degree of corruption, the 
larger the right hand side of the equation and so the less likely that short-term aid be given. 
Turning to the impact of the severity of the disaster we see that this has two effects which go 
in opposite directions. The greater the severity of the disaster, the higher the marginal cost of 
saving a life and so the larger is the right hand side of (11), which means the more likely it is 
that no aid will be given. However, the greater the severity of the disaster the higher might be 
the perceived benefit of trying to save a life and so the less likely it is that no aid will be 
given. 
 In those cases where immediate relief is given -  ̂ 
    - then the same arguments 
indicate that  ̂ 
  will be a strictly decreasing function of the degree of corruption but can be 
either an increasing or decreasing function of the scale of the disaster depending on which of 
the two effects identified above is greater. 
Turning to the total amount of short-term aid given to a country struck by the disaster, 
we see from (8) that this is: 
 ̂ 
    
 
   ̂ 
          
  
      
                                                                                                    
So the amount of short-term humanitarian aid depends on just three factors: the scale of the 
disaster,  ; the severity of the disaster,   and the level of corruption,  . Total short-term 
humanitarian aid is directly proportional to the scale of the disaster, similar to long-term aid. 
In relation to both the severity of the disaster and the level of corruption there are two 
opposing effects. The direct effect implies that an increase in the severity of the disaster 
means that more aid has to be given to achieve any given survival fraction, while an increase 
in the level of corruption means that more has to be spent in any given country to ensure that 
a given amount of aid reaches the victims. However there is also the indirect effect that an 
increase in both severity and corruption reduces the optimal survival fraction which reduces 
the amount of aid that will be given. 
At this level of generality it is difficult to say much about which of these two effects 
dominates. To make some progress, we consider the functional forms for        and     
 
 
  
that we introduced in (4) and (6) respectively and substitute them into (11): 
 ̂ 
  
  
  
      
   {  [(
                
  
)
 
   
  ]}                                
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Now consider the impact of the severity of the disaster on short-term aid. If    , no 
short term aid will be given if the disaster is sufficiently mild (less severe) and if    , then 
short-term aid will also not be given if the disaster is extremely severe. If    , then a 
positive amount of short-term aid will certainly be given if the disaster is severe and, if 
positive, the amount of short-term aid will be a strictly increasing function of the severity of 
disaster. More specifically, 
  ̂ 
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]
 
 
 
 
                            
From (32) we can see that the value inside the square brackets is positive, so 
  ̂ 
  
   
if   
 
     
, which suggests an inverse U-shaped function. 
Turning now to the impact of corruption on short-term aid, we can see from the term in 
square brackets in (31) that if the degree of corruption is sufficiently large, then no short-term 
aid will be given. However if the degree of corruption is low and the amount of short-term 
aid is high, then ̂  
  
  
      
 
   
(
           
  
)
 
   
. Thus, short-term aid will be a strictly 
increasing function of the degree of corruption. Taken together, this suggests an inverse U-
shaped relation between short-term humanitarian aid and the degree of corruption. Finally we 
observe that short-term aid is not influenced by  . We can summarise the above discussion in 
Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4 Short-term humanitarian aid is an increasing function of the scale of the 
disaster; may either be a strictly increasing or an inverse U-shaped function of the 
severity of the disaster and an inverse U-shaped function of corruption. Short term aid is 
not affected by the per capita GDP. 
Next we turn to the predictions in terms of what can be observed, number of people 
killed,  ; number of people affected,   and the amount of financial loss,  . Proposition 1 and 
Proposition 4 are used to conduct this analysis. We see that short-term humanitarian aid is 
certainly an increasing function of the severity of the disaster over an initial range of severity. 
To the extent that short-term humanitarian aid is an increasing function of the severity of the 
disaster (at least over a range of values of severity), we can come to the following 
conclusions, which is summarised in Proposition 5. 
When   increases, it will increase  , which in turn increases ̂ ; while it increases  , 
which will increases ̂ . Therefore, an increase in the number of people killed will increase 
the amount of immediate relief that the affected country attracts. As far as the total number of 
people affected and the financial loss are concerned, there are opposing effects. When   
increases, it will increase  , which in turn increases  ̂ while it decreases  , which will 
decreases ̂ . So the effect is ambiguous. Likewise, when   increases, it will decrease  , 
which in turn decreases  ̂ while it increases  , which will increase ̂ , causing the effect to 
be ambiguous. 
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Proposition 5 So long as the short-term humanitarian aid is an increasing function of 
the severity of the disaster, it is an increasing function of the number of people killed, 
while the effects of the number affected and financial loss are ambiguous. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we investigate whether the disaster-related factors and country-specific 
characteristics influence the amount of humanitarian aid - immediate and long-term relief - 
disbursed by the donors. The former refers to type of disaster, scale and severity of disaster, 
while the latter is related to the level of development, corruption and the size of the country. 
The scale and severity of the disaster cannot be directly observed. The empirical analysis uses 
variables that can be observed, detailed description of which follows in sub section 3.1. 
Our empirical investigation seeks answers to questions such as the following. Is the 
amount of disaster relief received by the affected countries related to the scale of financial 
damage caused by the natural disaster? Do the donors tend to cluster the disaster relief where 
it will have the largest impact on the victims in terms of saving lives and reducing suffering? 
Do resource-poor countries receive more disaster relief? Does the level of corruption in the 
affected countries influence donors' aid disbursement? Does the type of disaster (such as 
earthquake, flood etc.) have an effect on the aid? Do these relationships differ between 
immediate relief and long-term humanitarian aid? For instance, does higher financial loss 
attract higher long term aid because of the need for reconstruction and number of people 
killed attract higher short term aid because it indicates the severity of the disaster in claiming 
lives. 
 
3.1. Description and Sources of data 
We use the data on the effects of the natural disasters that occurred during 1995 - 2008 
and the humanitarian aid that was received towards these disasters. The impact of each 
disaster is different from another. Some disasters would have killed more people, but the 
financial loss could be less, and vice versa. There are disasters which have resulted in no 
deaths whereas there are others with no financial loss. Our data set includes 186 countries 
which were struck by 5394 disasters over this period. 
Data on the occurrences of natural disasters, the type of disaster and the damages caused 
by them are obtained from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), maintained by the 
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the University of Louvain. 
The three explanatory variables that capture the damage caused by the disaster are the 
number of people killed, number of people affected (this includes those who are homeless, 
injured and those badly affected, in need of immediate relief) and the amount of financial 
loss. The type of disaster is included in the analysis as a dummy variable which could be one 
of earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, landslide or avalanche, wildfires, volcano, storm, 
extreme temperature and tsunami. All this data is freely available on the public domain
7
. The 
URL for this database is http://www.emdat.be/. 
                                                          
7
 Two other sources of data on natural disasters are Sigma from Swiss Re and NatCat from Munich Re; 
however, these two sources are maintained by private insurance companies and not available in the public 
domain. 
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The EM-DAT database provides updated information about the natural disasters that 
took place around the world and the consequences brought by them. For a disaster to be 
included in the EM-DAT database, it should meet at least one of the following criteria: at 
least ten people killed, at least hundred people affected, a state of emergency is called or 
international assistance is called for. The number of people killed refers to those who died as 
a direct consequence of the disaster (even though it includes those who are presumed dead, 
the figure is adjusted as and when the correct information is received). The financial loss is 
an estimate of the value of the assets that the country had lost due to a given disaster by. 
When it comes to the total number of people affected, it is worth mentioning that the extent 
of the injuries to those who are injured, and the extent of damage to properties and houses of 
those who became homeless are not known. For the purpose of comparing with the 
theoretical framework, we do not know whether all the people who are under total affected 
are in need of immediate relief or long term aid. 
Other than these disaster related explanatory variables and the dummy variable for the 
type of disaster, we also have three variables that capture the socio economic characteristics 
of the affected country. These are the corruption perception index (CPI), GDP per capita, and 
the total population of the country. The CPI, as the term suggests, captures the level of 
corruption. The CPI index assesses each country's perceived levels of corruption as 
determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. This data is publicly available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi. The higher is the CPI, the 
less corrupt the country is. The GDP per capita indicates the average income of an individual 
in the country and how wealthy a country is. The population variable does not feature in our 
theoretical model. We decided to control for it to see whether the size of the country has any 
influence on the donors. Data on GDP per capita and population size are made available by 
the United Nations Statistics Division. The URL for this UNSTAT database is 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp. 
The dependent variable is the humanitarian aid that was received by the affected country 
as a response to the disasters. For our analysis we have used data from Project-Level Aid 
(PLAID) version beta 1.9.2 which can be found on http://www. AidData.org. There are 
several other sources of data for humanitarian aid which are available. The two commonly 
known database include the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) maintained by the OECD and 
the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) maintained by the UN. The CRS aid activity database 
collects information on official development assistance and other official flows to developing 
countries. The aid activity data come from donors, including 22 member countries of the 
OECD's DAC, the European Commission and other international organizations. The data are 
part of DAC members' official statistical reporting to the OECD, while the non-OECD 
donors' reporting takes place on a voluntary basis.  
The FTS is a global, real-time database which records all reported international 
humanitarian aid, including that for NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 
bilateral aid, in-kind aid, and private donations. The FTS aid database features a special focus 
on consolidated and flash appeals, because they cover the major humanitarian crises and 
because their funding requirements are well defined - which allows FTS to indicate to what 
extent populations in crisis receive humanitarian aid in proportion to needs. The information 
provided in this database is compiled by UN OCHA on the basis of information provided by 
donors and appealing organizations. The nature of information reported by this database is as 
follows: the natural disaster event, the recipient of disaster relief, the month and year in 
which the disaster took place, the amount of funding in US dollars, percentage of grand total, 
and the amount of uncommitted pledges in US dollars. 
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In 2003, another humanitarian aid database, the Project-Level Aid (PLAID), was 
developed by William and Mary University and Brigham Young University. It aimed to be a 
database of development finance activities with granular activity and purpose coding and as 
much descriptive detail as possible at the project level. The humanitarian aid data contained 
in the PLAID database comes from a number of sources, including the OECD's CRS, annual 
reports and project documents published by donors, web-accessible databases and project 
documents, and spread sheets and data exports obtained directly from donor agencies. The 
majority of the aid activities in this database are drawn from the OECD's CRS. For donors 
who are not members of the OECD DAC or do not report to the OECD CRS, data were 
gathered through many different channels. Few versions of the PLAID data existed, but the 
version which we used in our empirical analysis was the PLAID beta 1.9.2. 
It is important to note that, in 2009, a new database "AidData" was formed through the 
merger of 2 existing programs: Project-level aid (PLAID) and Accessible Information on 
Development Activities (AiDA). It is a partnership between Brigham Young University, the 
College of William and Mary and a non-profit development organization, Development 
Gateway. However, the coverage of this database was not extensive during our empirical 
investigation; thus, we were suggested to use the earlier version, PLAID beta 1.9.2. AidData 
has the objective of increasing the impact of aid through making information more available, 
easily accessible and more meaningful to all the relevant parties. This obviously improves the 
quality of research about aid allocation and effectiveness. 
The coverage of this data set includes information on each individual project committed 
by both bilateral and multilateral aid donors during 1973-2009.
8
 It also provides detailed 
coding for a variety of additional factors which makes it possible for us to obtain data on 
disaster relief for emergencies caused by natural factors only. The descriptive information 
given for each entry enabled us to match the disaster relief with the specific disaster event. 
There are some cases where we could not match them perfectly because the aid could match 
more than one disaster which took place in that country and year. For the panel data analysis 
that we carry out, we only need the aid to be matched with the type of disaster, country and 
year the disaster took place and the damage it caused. 
Table 1 gives the information about the number of disasters, the extent of damage that is 
caused by the disasters, captured by the number of people killed, affected and the amount of 
financial loss resulted from different types of disasters that occurred during the period that is 
being investigated. 
Type Number of  Number of  Number of  Financial loss 
 disasters People killed People affected (million US $) 
Earthquake 359 503,659 185,795,103 424,219.9933 
Flood 1,947 127,075   8,096,765,200 272,634.8965 
Drought 250 6,406 1,110,003,220           41,581.2970 
Epidemic 799 96,484 7,245,171                    1.7000 
Landslide/ Avalanche 244 12,017 3,611,713             5,566.8230 
Wildfires 182                 924   2,003,512,730           21,007.3110 
Volcano 80 303 1,556,926                203.0910 
Storm 1,280 121,737 1,760,874,330 660,268.6931 
Extreme temperature 232 94,545 84,404,594           45,142.5590 
Tsunami 21 593,542 8,746,597           20,004.4000 
                                                          
8
 Our sample period is restricted to 1995 - 2008 due to the availability of data on corruption perception index. 
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                           Table 1: Natural disasters and consequences during 1995 - 2008. 
In what follows, we give detailed discussion on our humanitarian aid data. First of all, we 
find out the total humanitarian aid that is received towards each disaster. Then we went on to 
categorised it into two types: short-term and long-term disaster reliefs, based on the long 
descriptions provided by the database. The broad criteria used in our classification are as 
follows. The short-term disaster relief refers to the immediate assistance offered to the 
victims of natural disasters to ensure their survival, usually taking the form of distributions of 
food, water, medical supplies, and provision of temporary shelters etc., while the long-term 
disaster relief refers to the donors' supports in the reconstruction and rehabilitation 
programmes that take place in the countries affected by the natural disaster. It is important to 
highlight that the long-term disaster relief does not include investment in disaster mitigation 
nor does it include investment in disaster prevention and preparedness programmes. 
According to the reported data that we use for this investigation, some disasters have 
attracted no humanitarian aid at all whereas others have attracted short term or long term aid, 
while there are some which have attracted both types. The objective of our empirical analysis 
is to find out what factors drive these differences.  
 
3.2. Empirical Methodology 
We conducted a panel data analysis to find out the determinants of disaster relief. We 
considered the fact that the humanitarian aid that is received can never be negative. The 
regression model is described in (33). The subscript   denotes the 186 different countries and 
the subscript                 denotes the year. The dependent variable is the 
humanitarian aid given by    
            where    
     
  and    
  refer to the short-term 
disaster relief, long-term disaster and total disaster relief, respectively. The model considers 
the fact that the dependent variable, humanitarian aid, cannot be negative. Three separate 
regressions were run to find out how these three dependent variables are influenced by the 
explanatory variables. 
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The explanatory variables                          denote the amount of financial 
loss, number of peopled killed and the number of people affected by natural disasters by 
respectively. The variables           ,        and     denote the number of population, 
GDP per capita and the corruption perception index of the recipient country respectively. 
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There could be more than one disaster in one country in a particular year which could 
also be influential in determining the amount of aid that is received. The number of disasters 
that occurred in a particular year is captured by the variable,         . The rest of the 
variables are dummy variables, which equal to one if that particular type of disaster occurred 
at least once in that country in that year and zero otherwise. 
The independent variable that the model has to explain is the amount of humanitarian 
aid. We have used an interval regression model for our panel data analysis. If we use a panel 
data model without restrictions, the estimates will be inconsistent with the slopes being 
downward biased and the intercept being upward biased. We take into account that    : 
estimate                    with     . A tobit model would be consistent because it 
will give maximum likelihood estimates. It assumes that                     and 
              and does not depend on  . Interval regression models are ordered tobit 
models with fixed cut off points and give consistent maximum likelihood estimates, so that 
they are more suitable for our investigation. Moreover, interval regressions have the added 
benefit that the slope estimates could be interpreted as if we had run an unrestricted panel 
estimate model. 
 
3.3. Empirical Results 
In this subsection, we present the results from our empirical analysis. Table 2, Table 3 
and Table 4 contain the results from our empirical investigation of the determinants of total 
humanitarian aid, short term disaster relief and long term disaster relief respectively. The 
standard errors are given within parentheses and 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate that the variable are 
statistically significant at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively. Variables    
  
and         are in millions of US dollars;        and          are in thousands;        is 
in current US dollars and     is given as an index which is between zero and ten. 
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Table 2: Determinants of Total Disaster Relief 
For all three regressions, the number killed and financial loss are highly significant at 
1%, suggesting that an increase in the number of people killed by the disaster and an increase 
in the amount of financial loss will result in an increase in disaster relief. Though people who 
are dead cannot benefit from humanitarian aid, number killed is an indicator of the severity of 
the disaster and assistance from the donors to minimise further suffering and restore the 
damage. It also could mean that many bread winners of families being dead, requiring 
financial assistance for the affected families in the long run. When number of people killed 
increases by a thousand, it attracts $0.29 short term aid, $4.03 million long term aid and 
$4.16 million total humanitarian aid. A million dollar financial loss will attract $0.0009856 
million total humanitarian aid. Though financial loss needs restoration in the long run, it 
indicates the severity of the disaster thus immediate relief is also necessary. The empirical 
results do indicate that a million dollar loss would attract $0.0002 million short term aid 
while attracting a higher amount of $0.0016 long term aid. 
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    Table 3: Determinants of Short Term Disaster Relief 
Total aid and long term aid significantly increases (at 1% level of statistical significance) 
with the number of people affected by the disasters. However, the amount is not that high. If 
the number of affected people increased by a thousand, the long term disaster relief will 
increase by $0.00004 million while total humanitarian aid will increase by $0.0000305 
million. 
It is important to note that the number of people affected by natural disaster includes 
those who became homeless, injured and affected severely and in need of immediate 
assistance. They could therefore be in need of short term aid as well as long term aid - i.e. 
homeless people would need help to rebuild their homes. The outcome of our investigation is 
that number of people increased long term aid with statistical significance, while its effect on 
short term aid was not significant. The empirical results suggest through this indicator that 
there was more long term need rather than short term need. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Long Term Disaster Relief 
The level of development and size of the economy, captured by the GDP per capita and 
size of population are found not to be significant in determining either type of humanitarian 
aid, indicating that the donors do not consider the level of development of the affected 
country when it comes to the allocation of humanitarian aid. Even though GDP per capita is 
not statistically significant, it is worth noticing that when GDP per capita increases by a 
dollar, short term aid increases by $3.68, while long term aid increases by $20.6. This could 
be because the value of the amount of damage caused by the disaster would be higher in the 
richer countries, needing more money for restoration. 
It is interesting to note that level of corruption is highly significant at 1% level for total, 
long-term and short-term humanitarian aid, with higher level of corruption leading to higher 
amount of aid being given. When it comes to humanitarian aid, the donors are so concerned 
about the victims that they give more to compensate for what might be leaked out due to 
corruption. 
The number of disasters (given by the variable, Disasters) is a significant determinant in 
all three regressions. If a country is hit by an additional disaster, it attracts $1.14 million short 
term aid (at 10% level of statistical significance) and $9.78 million long term aid (at 1% level 
of statistical significance), while the increase in total aid would be $4.91 million (1% level of 
significance). The more a country is prone to being hit by disasters, the more long term aid it 
attracts. Short-term aid is significantly increased because of flood, earthquake (at 5% level of 
statistical significance), tsunami and drought (at 1% level of statistical significance). The 
donors recognise that these types of disasters would require more immediate assistance. It 
also could be because these disasters attract more publicity about the hardship suffered by the 
victims. It is worth mentioning that extreme temperature reduces short term aid significantly. 
Long-term aid statistically increases with earthquake, storm (at 1% level of statistical 
significance), tsunami and drought (at 5% level of statistical significance). These disasters 
would damage buildings and other assets, which require long term assistance to rebuild. 
Disasters which are of the type wildfires, epidemic and extreme temperature result in 
significantly less long term aid. Donors should probably be informed of the necessity of 
increasing aid when a country is hit by extreme temperature. Wildfires, epidemic and extreme 
temperature, therefore, are not receiving as much humanitarian aid in relation to the scale and 
severity of the disaster, compared to other types of disasters. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We have analysed the factors that influence the amount of humanitarian aid received by 
countries which are struck by natural disasters. This analysis was carried out both 
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theoretically and empirically, drawing a distinction between the amount of humanitarian aid 
received as immediate relief and what is received as long term humanitarian aid. The 
theoretical model shows how the humanitarian aid that is given depends on the scale and 
severity of the disaster which are not observable as well as factors that are observable - 
disaster-specific variables (number of people killed, affected and financial loss) and country-
specific variables (GDP per capita and corruption). The predictions of the theoretical model 
are able to predict and explain the empirical results that followed. 
Our empirical results show that both the number of people killed and financial loss which 
indicate the severity of a disaster are statistically significant, while the number of people 
affected is significant only for the long term aid. If possible, it might be worth trying to break 
this down into long term and short term needs of those affected. Level of development is not 
statistically significant in determining the level of humanitarian aid. Corruption significantly 
increases humanitarian aid of either type, indicating the high inequality aversion of the 
donors, who care for the victims to such an extent. 
 Research about humanitarian aid can be taken forward in various ways. In particular, the 
factors affecting disaster relief given towards different types of mitigation, which includes the 
damage caused by different types of natural disasters, is worth studying. This problem can be 
analysed both from the donor's and the recipient's perspective. It is also worthwhile 
investigating the types of mitigation efforts that are effective, so that such projects could be 
promoted and financed. 
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